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CASENOTES
In Re Post-Newsweek Stations and Chandler
v. Florida: Television on Trial
In two cases decided in the mid-sixties, Estes v. Texas and
Sheppard v. Maxwell, the Supreme Court of the United States
held that extensive media coverage of these criminal trials de-
nied the defendants due process of the law. In 1979, in In re
Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., the Supreme Court of
Florida adopted rules that allowed the televising of trials. This
note analyzes both the Post-Newsweek case and the recent de-
cision in Chandler v. Florida, in which the Supreme Court of
the United States reviewed an application of Florida's rules on
the televising of trials, recognized that such media coverage
does not inherently deny due process, and permitted the states
freedom to experiment with media coverage programs. Future
challengers to programs like Florida's must base their attacks
on specific showings of prejudice. As opportunities for media
coverage and possibilities for demonstrable prejudice expand
in the years to come, television may remain on trial.
Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., an affiliate of the
American Broadcasting Company, filed a petition to modify Canon
3A(7) of the Code of Judicial Conduct of the State of Florida to
permit the televising of judicial proceedings.' The Supreme Court
of Florida decided initially to implement an experimental program
for the televising of one criminal case and one civil case. The court
adopted a series of guidelines to aid the judge in maintaining order
at these proceedings, but the trial judge encountered great diffi-
1. In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 327 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1976). In its original
form, Canon 3A(7) of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct stated: "A judge should prohibit
broadcasting, televising, recording, or taking photographs in the courtroom and areas imme-
diately adjacent thereto during sessions of court or recesses between sessions . .. ." re-
printed in In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 370 So. 2d 764, 765 n.2 (Fla. 1979).
The Canon did, however, allow for three basic exceptions to this prohibition: (1) use of
electronic media for judicial administration, including the presentation of evidence; (2) cov-
erage for naturalization and ceremonial proceedings; and (3) use for instructional purposes
in educational institutions. Id.
2. 327 So. 2d at 2.
3. Id. The guidelines enumerated by the court included:
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culty in obtaining the consent of parties and counsel for televising
the trial. To remedy this situation, the supreme court, in a supple-
mental interlocutory order, granted authority to an additional
judge to conduct the experiment." The court then mandated a pilot
program authorizing electronic media coverage' in Florida court-
rooms from July 5, 1977, to June 30, 1978.6 At the final stage of the
proceedings, the Supreme Court of Florida held: Electronic media
coverage of a courtroom is not per se a denial of a defendant's
right to due process under the fourteenth amendment to the Con-
stitution, nor do the first and sixth amendments require the court
to permit electronic media coverage of courtroom proceedings. The
court amended Canon 3A(7) of the Florida Code of Judicial Con-
duct, permitting electronic media coverage of trials under specified
guidelines. In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 370 So. 2d
764 (Fla. 1979)."
The debate over whether to permit the electronic media into
the courtroom began with the Lindbergh kidnapping case in 1935.8
In the trial, which created a worldwide sensation, still photogra-
phers inundated the courtroom with large and noisy cameras and
artificial lighting.' The court gave the photographers and newsmen
1. The parties to the litigation, jurors and witnesses must consent to the
televising of their participation in the trial.
3. The trial judge shall have full authority to terminate the televising of all
or any part of the proceedings which he deems would be an effective interference
in the administration of the justice of the cause.
4. 337 So. 2d 804, 805 (Fla. 1976). Initially, Judge Ben C. Willis, Chief Judge of the
Second Judicial Circuit, was the only judge authorized to conduct a trial in the presence of
the electronic media. He encountered great difficulty, however, in securing permission from
various parties and counsel to conduct the experiment. The Supreme Court of Florida then
granted similar authority to Judge Parker McDonald, Circuit Judge of the Ninth Judicial
Circuit.
5. This note adopts the supreme court's use of the term "electronic media" to include
other media as well. "Unless the context otherwise requires, 'electronic media' shall be used
as a generic term that encompasses television film and videotape cameras, still photography
cameras, tape recording devices, and radio broadcast equipment." 370 So. 2d at 765 n.1.
6. In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 347 So. 2d 404, 404 (Fla. 1978).
7. The Supreme Court of Florida stated:
The presiding judge may exclude electronic media coverage of a particular par-
ticipant only upon a finding that such coverage will have a substantial effect
upon the particular individual which would be qualitatively different from the
effect on members of the public in general and such effect will be qualitatively
different from coverage by other types of media.
370 So. 2d at 779.
8. State v. Hauptmann, 115 N.J.L. 412, 180 A. 809, cert. denied, 296 U.S. 649 (1935).
9. See Aspen, Cameras in the Courtroom: The Florida Experiment, 67 ILL. B.J. 82, 82
(1978).
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virtually free access to any part of the courtroom, 10 creating a "cir-
cus-like" atmosphere that totally disrupted the smooth and effi-
cient operation of the trial.1 As a result of the serious disruptions
at the Lindbergh trial, the American Bar Association adopted Ca-
non 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics in 1937.12
In another highly publicized criminal trial, Estes v. Texas,"
the Supreme Court of the United States confronted this issue.
Billie Sol Estes, a well-known financier, had been convicted of
swindling in a trial televised over his objection. The Court held
that the broadcasting of his notorious and highly sensational crimi-
nal trial had deprived Estes of his fourteenth amendment right to
due process.14 The Court could not agree, however, on whether the
Constitution required the exclusion of television from criminal tri-
als. Four Justices said yes; four Justices said no; and Justice
Harlan, who provided the fifth vote for reversal, was uncertain.1 6
The Estes trial was a technological nightmare. Cables and
wires stretched across the courtroom floor, and three microphones
sat on the judge's bench." The cameras were huge, unwieldy, and
noisy, requiring artificial lighting for their operation. The Court
could not determine the specific effects of the electronic media and
this "circus-like" atmosphere on the trial, but instead condemned
the practice of televising a criminal trial as being inherently preju-
10. See Cameras in the Courtroom: A Denial of Due Process? 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 853,
853 (1978).
11. Id.
12. Id. ABA CANONS OF JUDicMiAL ETHIcs No. 35 was renumbered as Canon 3A(7) in
1972. 32 FLA. STAT. ANN. Canon 3A(7), Commentary, at 291 (West Supp. 1980). The original
Canon 35 stressed three reasons for the prohibition of media activities: 1) The broadcasting
or televising of court proceedings detracted froin the basic dignity of the proceedings; 2) the
broadcasting distracted the participants and witnesses in giving their testimony; and 3) it
degraded the court and fostered serious public misconceptions about the function of the
court.
13. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
14. Id.
15. Id. (Clark, J.; Warren, C.J., concurring, joined by Douglas & Goldberg, JJ.; Harlan,
J., concurring separately; Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Black, Brennan, & White, JJ.);
see Aspen, supra note 9, at 82-83.
16. 381 U.S. at 536. The New York Times described the proceedings more colorfully:
A television motor van, big as an intercontinental bus, was parked outside
the courthouse and the second floor courtroom was a forest of equipment. Two
television cameras had been set up inside the bar and four more marked cameras
were aligned just outside the gates.
A microphone stuck its 12-inch snout inside the jury box, now occupied by
an overflow of reporters from the press table, and three microphones confronted
Judge Dunagan on his bench. Tables [sic] and wires snaked over the floor.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1962, at 46, col. 4.
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dicial to the defendant.17 The Estes Court delicately balanced the
media's arguments that the right to televise trials inheres in the
first amendment and supports an accused's sixth amendment right
to a public trial, against the contending argument that such cover-
age infringed upon Estes' fundamental right to due process. Con-
cluding that the due process concerns took precedence, the Court
applied the rule of Rideau v. Louisiana:"s any procedure that in-
herently prejudices the right of a defendant to an unbiased trial
(despite its actual effect) denies him due process of law.19
The Supreme Court's inherent distrust of the electronic media
continued in Sheppard v. Maxwell.20 In an opinion by Justice
Clark,2 the Court dealt with a highly publicized murder trial in
which the news media had jammed the courtroom. Cameramen
had photographed prospective jurors during the jury selection.'
After the trial opened, the witnesses, counsel, and jurors were pho-
tographed and televised whenever they entered or left the court-
room, and the defendant had to pose for newspaper and television
photographers for ten minutes before each court session began.*s
The Supreme Court stressed that the trial court in Sheppard had
permitted the jurors to go their separate ways outside of the court-
room without adequate directions to avoid reading or listening to
anything about the case. Consequently, the jurors were exposed to
the massive newspaper, radio, and television coverage of the trial.
The Court said that the totality of the circumstances in Sheppard
mandated the use of the due process test applied in Estes--due
process is lacking when the defendant can demonstrate a signifi-
cant probability of prejudice' 4 The defendant need not show iden-
tifiable prejudice.' Applying this test, the Court reasoned that the
extensive prejudicial pretrial publicity and media saturation dur-
ing the trial had deprived Sheppard of the "judicial serenity and
calm to which [he] was entitled."'" The Sheppard Court, however,
17. 381 U.S. at 544. In fact, Justice Clark readily admitted that "(tielevision in its pre-
sent state and by its very nature, reaches into a variety of areas in which it may cause
prejudice to an accused. Still one cannot put his finger on its specific mischief and prove
with particularity wherein he was prejudiced." Id.
18. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
19. 381 U.S. at 543, 550.
20. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
21. Justice Clark also authored the majority opinion in Estes.
22. 384 U.S. at 343.
23. Id. at 344.
24. Id. at 352.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 355 (quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. at 536) (brackets in original).
[Vol. 35:345
IN RE POST-NEWSWEEK STATIONS
could not describe the specific negative effect of the electronic me-
dia on the courtroom proceedings, and therefore based its conclu-
sion on the vague notion that the courtroom procedure "involve[d]
such a probability that prejudice will result that it [was] inher-
ently lacking in due process." 7
The Court's rigid stand against the presence of electronic me-
dia in the courtroom began to erode in the mid-1970's. During this
period the Court began to modify its Estes-Sheppard approach-
that cameras and microphones in the courtroom inherently
prejudice a defendant's right to a fair trial, whatever their appar-
ent effect-and began granting greater leeway for media operations
in and around the courtroom.
In Murphy v. Florida,"6 the extensive newspaper and televi-
sion publicity surrounding the trial included information about the
defendant and his past criminal record. During voir dire, the jurors
had revealed no predisposed hostility toward the defendant despite
the publicity. By distinguishing the facts in Rideau, Estes, and
Sheppard from those before it, the Court began its restriction of
the Estes-Sheppard approach by requiring the defendant to show
that the extensive media coverage had prejudiced his trial.29 Exam-
ining the totality of the circumstances, 0 the Court affirmed the
conviction because the defendant had failed to show that the set-
ting of the trial was "inherently prejudicial."'1
In Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,3 2 the Court signaled
that it would continue its retreat from the Estes-Sheppard stand
that restricted electronic media in the courtroom. Chief Justice
Burger emphasized that pervasive pretrial publicity does not inevi-
tably lead to an unfair trial. 3 The trial judge has the power and
the responsibility to take measures designed to mitigate the nega-
tive effects of pretrial publicity.' The Court noted the trial judge's
conclusion that massive pretrial publicity would jeopardize the de-
27. Id. at 352 (quoting 381 U.S. at 542-43) (emphasis added by Sheppard Court).
28. 421 U.S. 794 (1975).
29. See notes 23-24 and accompanying text supra.
30. 421 U.S. at 799.
31. Id. at 803.
32. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
33. Id. at 554.
34. The trial judge has a major responsibility. What the judge says about a case,
in or out of the courtroom, is likely to appear in newspapers and broadcasts.
More important, the measures a judge takes or fails to take to mitigate the ef-
fects of pretrial publicity ...may well determine whether the defendant re-
ceives a trial consistent with the requirements of due process.
Id. at 555.
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fendant's right to a fair trial, but found that prior restraints on the
publication of judicial proceedings held in public violated the first
amendment rights of the press."
In the Post-Newsweek case" the Supreme Court of Florida
took the next significant step in the coverage of trials by the elec-
tronic media. Although this decision dealt primarily with the tele-
vising of trials in Florida, the supreme court based its reasoning on
the rationale developed by the Supreme Court of the United States
since the mid-1960's. 37 The Post-Newsweek decision, however, re-
flected a more modern sociological emphasis and acknowledged sig-
nificant advances in media technology. 8
In Post-Newsweek, the Florida court armed itself with a mod-
ern arsenal of sociological data to facilitate an analysis of the ef-
fects of televising trials.8 9 In addition, the court noted the crude
state of television cameras and equipment at the time of the Estes
decision 0 and focused on Justice Clark's proviso in that opinion:
"When the advances in these arts permit reporting by printing
press or by television without their present hazards to a fair trial
we will have another case."4' The court was also quick to recognize
Justice Harlan's foresight: "[T]he day may come when television
will have become so commonplace an affair in the daily life of the
average person as to dissipate all reasonable likelihood that its use
in courtrooms may disparage the judicial process.
'42
The modern innovations in electronic media technology sup-
port the shift that Justice Harlan predicted. Today, a spectator at
a televised trial would not notice any television cables or artificial
lighting, 4 and technology has drastically reduced the noise level of
the cameras.
35. Id. at 570. See generally Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
36. 370 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1979).
37. See notes 13-35 and accompanying text supra.
38. 370 So. 2d at 775-76, 780.
39. Id. at 767-70, 785.
40. Id. at 772.
41. Id. at 773 (quoting 381 U.S. at 540).
42. Id. (quoting 381 U.S. at 595) (Harlan, J., concurring). Televison has in fact become
a commonplace occurrence in everyday life. Banks use closed circuit television cameras as
security devices. Cameras are also common in hotel lobbies, bookstores, and apartment com-
plexes. In Florida, one finds cameras in all levels of government. The court considered com-
ments about the positive effect of television coverage of the Florida Legislature. Id. at 780.
The Supreme Court of Florida also noted Justice Harlan's recognition of the benefits to be
derived from state experimentation with electronic media coverage. Id. at 773.
43. See Aspen, supra note 9, at 85.
44. 370 So. 2d at 775.
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To overcome the problem of a lack of empirical data on the
effects of televising trials, the Supreme Court of Florida relied on a
survey of individuals previously associated with televised trials.4
The results of the survey indicated that the negative effects of the
electronic media were generally insignificant," although the court
45. JUDICIAL PLANNING COORDINATION UNIT, OFFICE OF THE STATE COURTS ADMINISTRA-
TOR, A SAMPLE SURVEY INVOLVING ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND STILL PHOTOGRAPHY COVERAGE IN
FLORIDA COURTS (1978); 370 So. 2d at 767-70.
46. (1) Presence of the electronic media in the courtroom had little effect upon
the respondents' perception of the judiciary or of the dignity of the proceedings.
(2) It was felt that the presence of electronic media disrupted the trial ei-
ther not at all or only slightly.
(3) Respondents' awareness of the presence of electronic media averaged be-
tween slightly and moderately.
(4) The ability of the attorney and juror respondents to judge the truthful-
ness of witnesses was perceived to be affected not at all. The ability of jurors to
concentrate on the testimony was similarly unaffected.
(5) All respondents were made to feel slightly self-conscious by the presence
of electronic media.
(6) Both jurors and witnesses perceived that the presence of electronic me-
dia made them feel just slightly more responsible for their actions.
(7) Presence of electronic media made all respondents feel only slightly ner-
vous or more attentive.
(8) The distracting effect of electronic media was deemed to range from al-
most not at all for jurors, to slightly for witnesses and attorneys.
(9) The degree to which jurors and witnesses felt the urge to see or hear
themselves on the media fell between not at all and slightly.
(10) Presence of electronic media affected the different participants' sense
of the importance of the case in varying degrees. Jurors felt that it made the
case more important to a slight degree; witnesses to a degree between slightly
and moderately; court personnel slightly; and attorneys moderately.
(11) To a degree between not at all and slightly, jurors perceived that the
presence of electronic media in the courtroom during the testimony of a witness
made that witness's testimony more important.
(12) There was no significant difference in the participants' concern over
being harmed as a result of their appearance on electronic media broadcast (in-
cluding still photography) as opposed to their names appearing in the print me-
dia. In each instance the concern ranged on the scale between not at all and
slightly.
(13) Jurors and witnesses manifested the same attitude concerning the pos-
sibility that persons would attempt to influence their decision or testimony.
There was no discernible difference. in the height of their concern as between
electronic and print media; the average response was slightly on the lower end of
the spectrum between not at all and slightly.
(14) Court personnel and attorneys perceived that the presence of electronic
media made the participating attorneys' actions more flamboyant only to a slight
extent.
(15) Court personnel and attorneys were of the attitude that the presence of
electronic media affected the flamboyancy of witnesses to a degree between not
at all and slightly.
(16) They also felt that the witnesses were slightly inhibited by the presence
of electronic media and that jurors were made slightly self-conscious, nervous,
19811
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admitted "that the survey results are nonscientific and reflect only
the respondents' attitudes and perceptions about the presence of
electronic media in the courtroom. ' 47 The court, citing the Florida
survey data and the technological advances in electronic media, as-
serted that the inherent prejudice found in Estes5 was no longer a
serious problem.
Justice Sundberg then considered and rejected the contention
that the first and sixth amendments mandate the coverage of
courtroom proceedings.4 ' The court cited Nixon v. Warner Com-
munications, Inc.50 and declared:
the Sixth Amendment [does not] require that the trial-or any
part of it-be broadcast live or on tape to the public. The re-
quirement of a public trial is satisfied by the opportunity of
members of the public and the press to attend the trial and to
report what they have observed."
Having disposed of the constitutional issues, the Post-News-
week court then analyzed specific problems noted by the oppo-
nents of electronic media coverage of judicial proceedings. 2 The
court recognized the potential problems inherent in media cover-
age of child custody proceedings, and in circumstances involving
prisoners, confidential informants, victims of sexual battery, and
witnesses requiring anonymity.5' The court, however, was justifia-
bly reluctant to compile a specific list of inappropriate parties for
media coverage or to formulate an absolute rule to deal with all the
potential problems." Instead, the court gave the presiding judge
the responsibility for evaluating the case-by-case effects of elec-
and distracted, but also slightly more attentive.
370 So. 2d at 768-69 (footnotes omitted).
47. Id. at 768. Some surveys do, however, yield disturbing results. In Wisconsin, where
trials were also televised for a one-year experiment, a random survey of 300 Wisconsin citi-
zens indicated that in the trial of a Mrs. Patri, who had been convicted of murder and
acquitted of arson, 59% of the respondents incorrectly remembered Mrs. Patri as having
been convicted of both murder and arson. Only 5% correctly remembered the verdict.
Thirty-nine percent could not remember the reason for the killing, and 25% of the respon-
dents could not identify her name. See Netteberg, Does Research Support the Estes Ban on
Cameras in the Courtroom?, 63 JUDMcATuR 467, 474 (1980).
48. "Television in its present state and by its very nature, reaches into a variety of
areas in which it may cause prejudice to an accused." 381 U.S. at 544. See also Turner v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
49. 370 So. 2d at 774.
50. 435 U.S. 589, 610 (1978).
51. 370 So. 2d at 774.
52. Id. at 774-79.
53. Id. at 779.
54. Id.
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tronic media in the courtroom.55 The court also placed strict limi-
tations on the number of cameras permitted in the courtroom, on
their location, and on the number of personnel authorized to oper-
ate the equipment.5 6 In setting these standards, the Post-News-
55. The presiding judge may exclude electronic media coverage of a particular
participant only upon a finding that such coverage will have a substantial effect
upon the particular individual which would be qualitatively different from the
effect on members of the public in general and such effect will be qualitatively
different from coverage by other types of media.
Id.. The wording of this passage may be vague and troublesome to some judges. See Palm
Beach Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 378 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), in which the court
reversed the trial court's acceptance of a motion and affidavits setting forth subjective fears
of two prospective witnesses that the televising of their testimony would jeopardize their
personal safety. The Fourth District rejected the State's contention "that the trial judge
need not support his decision to limit electronic or still photography coverage with a finding
of necessity." 378 So. 2d at 864.
In his dissent, Judge Letts questioned the majority's use of the word "necessity," which
the Florida Supreme Court had not used in its guidelines. He advocated the use of affidavits
to aid in the "findings" of the court, in lieu of the "full evidentiary hearing" he construed
the majority to require. Id. at 865.
56. 1. Equipment and personnel.
(a) Not more than one portable television camera [film camera-16 mm
sound on film (self blimped) or video tape electronic camera], operated by not
more than one camera person, shall be permitted in any trial court proceeding.
Not more than two televison cameras, operated by not more than one camera
person each, shall be permitted in any appellate court proceeding.
(b) Not more than one still photographer, utilizing not more than two lenses
for each camera and related equipment for print purposes shall be permitted in
any proceeding in a trial or appellate court.
(c) Not more than one audio system for radio broadcast purposes shall be
permitted in any proceeding in a trial or appellate court. Audio pickup for all
media purposes shall be accomplished from existing audio systems present in the
court facility. If no technically suitable audio system exists in the court facility,
microphones and related wiring essential for media purposes shall be unobstru-
sive and shall be located in places designated in advance of any proceeding by
the chief judge of the judicial circuit or district in which the court facility is
located.
(d) Any "pooling" arrangements among the media required by these limita-
tions on equipment and personnel shall be the sole responsibility of the media
without calling upon the presiding judge to mediate any dispute as to the appro-
priate media respresentative or equipment authorized to cover a particular pro-
ceeding. In the absence of advance media agreement on disputed equipment or
personnel issues, the presiding judge shall exclude all contesting media person-
nel from a proceeding.
2. Sound and light criteria.
(a) Only televison photographic and audio equipment which does not pro-
duce distracting sound or light shall be employed to cover judicial proceedings.
Specifically, such photographic and audio equipment shall produce no greater
sound or light than the equipment designated in Appendix A annexed hereto,
when the same is in good working order. No artificial lighting device of -any kind
shall be employed in connection with the television camera."
(b) Only still camera equipment which does not produce distracting sound
1981]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
week court thus charted a new direction for the use of the elec-
or light shall be employed to cover judicial proceedings. Specifically, such still
camera equipment shall produce no greater sound or light than a 35 mm Leica
"M" Series Rangefinder camera, and no artificial lighting device of any kind
shall be employed in connection with a still camera.
(c) It shall be the affirmative duty of media personnel to demonstrate to the
presiding judge adequately in advance of any proceeding that the equipment
sought to be utilized meets the sound and light criteria enunciated herein. A
failure to obtain advance judicial approval for equipment shall preclude its use
in any proceeding.
3. Location of equipment and personnel.
(a) Television camera equipment shall be positioned in such location in the
court facility as shall be designated by the chief judge of the judicial circuit or
district in which such facility is situated. The area designated shall provide rea-
sonable access to coverage. If and when areas remote from the court facility
which permit reasonable access to coverage are provided all television camera
and audio equipment shall be positioned only in such area. Video tape recording
equipment which is not a component part of a television camera shall be located
in an area remote from the court facility.
(b) A still camera photographer shall position himself or herself in such lo-
cation in the court facility as shall be designated by the chief judge of the judi-
cial circuit or district in which such facility is situated. The area designated shall
provide reasonable access to coverage. Still camera photographers shall assume a
fixed position within the designated area and, once a photographer has estab-
lished himself or herself in a shooting position, he or she shall act so as not to
call attention to himself or herself through further movement. Still camera pho-
tographers shall not be permitted to move about in order to obtain photographs
of court proceedings.
(c) Broadcast media representatives shall not move about the court facility
while proceedings are in session, and microphones or taping equipment once
positioned as required by 1(c) above shall not be moved during the pendency of
the proceeding.
4. Movement during proceedings.
News media photographic or audio equipment shall not be placed in or re-
moved from the court facility except prior to commencement or after adjourn-
ment of proceedings each day, or during a recess. Neither television film
magazines nor still camera film or lenses shall be changed within a court facility
except during a recess in the proceeding.
5. Courtroom light sources.
With the concurrence of the chief judge of a judicial circuit or district in
which a court facility is situated, modifications and additions may be made in
light sources existing in the facility, provided such modifications or additions are
installed and maintained without public expense.
6. Conferences of counsel.
To protect the attorney-client privilege and the effective right to counsel,
there shall be no audio pickup or broadcast of conferences which occur in a court
facility between attorneys and their clients, between co-counsel of a client, or
between counsel and the presiding judge held at the bench.
7. Impermissible use of media material.
None of the film, video tape, still photographs or audio reproductions devel-
oped during or by virtue of the pilot program shall be admissible as evidence in
the proceeding out of which it arose, any proceeding subsequent or collateral
thereto, or upon any retrial or appeal of such proceedings.
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tronic media in Florida courtrooms.
In an age of unobtrusive media technology, the Post-News-
week decision represents an important step in the process of
balancing the public's right to information with the due process
rights of defendants. Although the guidelines seem thorough and
straightforward, some disquieting problems may arise. What con-
stitutes a proper "finding" of specific prejudice? 57 How can a judge
determine whether electronic media coverage will have a suffi-
ciently substantial effect upon an individual to warrant the exclu-
sion of the electronic media from the courtroom?58 The Post-
Newsweek decision contained several examples of the serious di-
lemmas facing judges, as well as some of the serious errors made in
their evaluation of problems faced by certain witnesses required to
testify at a trial. 9
Opponents of permitting the electronic media in the court-
room have raised other objections: that televised jurors would feel
intense peer pressure to vote according to the wishes of friends,.0
that camera coverage would give the public the wrong impression
about the purpose of trials,61 and that jurors would sense the noto-
riety of a case from the camera's presence. 2 Opponents also argue
that cameras will distract jurors and other trial participants, and
370 So. 2d at 783-84 (adopting the standards governing the one-year pilot program origi-
nally set forth in 347 So. 2d 404, 405-06).
57. See Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 378 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979);
note 55 supra.
58. 370 So. 2d at 779.
59. Id. at 778. One glaring example concerned an inmate of a Florida prison whom the
state called as a witness. She requested that the court withdraw the electronic media cover-
age from the courtroom for fear of reprisals from other inmates if she testified. The trial
judge denied her request and, when she refused to testify, held her in contempt. See Net-
teburg, supra note 47, at 471 (prisoner held under contempt sentence for five months and
twenty-nine days).
60. See Cameras in the Courtroom, supra note 10, at 858.
61. 370 So. 2d at 776. Chief Justice Edward E. Pringle of the Colorado Supreme Court
once stated:
It [photography] certainly is better than the distorted pictures of the- people
involved which come from the artists who sit in the courtroom drawing and it
does away. . . with the unseemly and completely undignified situation of eight
or nine microphones being thrust in peoples' faces as they leave the courthouse
and being asked asinine questions which they don't answer anyway just to ac-
company the photographic representations which the cameras are making.
Letter from Chief Justice Pringle to Dick Leonard (Feb. 25, 1977).
62. 370 So. 2d 775. Proponents of electronic media coverage argue that the presence of
a camera does not make a case seem any more notorious than does the presence of a sketch
artist, newspaper reporters, or a full courtroom of people. The factual circumstances of the
specific case, and not the presence of a cameraman, determine whether the case is of great
public interest.
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that the lawyers will tend to grandstand.68 Despite many of these
reservations, the Supreme Court of Florida apparently be-
lieves-and rightly so-that it must accumulate a sufficient
amount of data from many types of trials to evaluate any possible
psychological effects on witnesses, jurors, and judges. The court
has taken an admirably pragmatic approach to the televising of tri-
als, a course apparently followed by the Supreme Court of the
United States.
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia," the Court contin-
ued to retreat from its rigid Estes-Sheppard stand against elec-
tronic media in the courtroom. The case involved a defendant's
fourth trial on the same murder charge before the same court. The
third mistrial may have resulted from a prospective juror's having
discussed with other prospective jurors a newspaper account of the
defendant's previous trials. Two reporters for the appellant, Rich-
mond Newspapers, attended the fourth trial. Defense counsel
moved to close the trial to the public; the prosecution did not ob-
ject, and the trial continued without spectators. Later that day, the
court granted appellant's request for a hearing on its motion to
vacate the court's closure order. Appellant contended that the
court should not order closure without first determining that there
was no other way to protect the defendant's rights. After the court
denied the motion, the trial continued with the press and public
excluded. The next day, the court found the defendant not guilty
after granting the defendant's motion to strike the prosecution's
evidence and excusing the jury."
In an opinion joined by Justices White and Stevens, Chief
Justice Burger announced the Court's judgment, reversing the de-
cision of the Supreme Court of Virginia that had denied review.
Approving of the inherent openness of a criminal trial under the
American justice system,66 and recognizing that first amendment
protection extends beyond freedom of the press and the right of
self-expression, the Court held that "[a]bsent an overriding inter-
est articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open
to the public."'67 Although the first amendment prohibits govern-
63. See Cameras in the Courtroom, supra note 10, at 859.
64. 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980).
65. Id. at 2818-20. The trial court later granted the newspaper's motion to intervene
nunc pro tunc. The Supreme Court of Virginia denied review, but the United States Su-
preme Court accepted the appeal. 444 U.S. 896 (1979).
66. 100 S. Ct. at 2825.
67. Id. at 2830 (footnote omitted).
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mental restriction of channels for public information," the Court
noted that the first amendment rights of the public and the press
are not absolute.
Just as a government may impose reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions upon the use of the streets in the interest of
such objectives as the free flow of traffic .... so may a trial
judge, in the interest of the fair administration of justice, impose
reasonable limitations on access to a trial. 
9
In Richmond the trial judge made no findings to support closure,
and absent any overriding interest indicated by the findings, the
Court held that the trial "must be left open to the public."70
The Richmond Court took a totality-of-the-circumstances ap-
proach 71 remarkably similar to the reasoning of the Supreme Court
of Florida in Post-Newsweek.1 ' Both the Florida court and the Su-
preme Court weighed all of the variables and made appropriate
discretionary rulings on an ad hoc basis. Neither the Supreme
Court nor the Florida court adhered to any firm constitutional re-
strictions or mandate; each recognized the necessity of a case-by-
case review.
The Court's emphasis on a totality-of-the-circumstances ap-
proach, coupled with its continued erosion of the Estes-Sheppard
anti-electronic media position, culminated in its decision in Chan-
dler v. Florida.5 In Chandler, two police officers were tried for
conspiracy to commit the burglary of a Miami Beach restaurant.
At voir dire, all the selected jurors asserted that they could remain
impartial despite the presence of a television camera in the court-
room. The trial judge denied a defense motion to sequester the
jury because of the television coverage, but instructed the jurors
not to watch or read anything about the case. The trial judge sug-
gested that the jurors "avoid the local news and watch only the
68. Id. at 2827. But see Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), which held
that the sixth amendment guarantee of a public trial for the accused gave neither the public
nor the press an enforceable right of access to a pretrial suppression hearing.
The Richmond Court did not overrule Gannett but distinguished it on the basis of the
absence in Richmond of any articulated justification for the closure order and the trial
court's apparent indifference towards alternatives to closure. Id. at 2829-30. For a thorough
analysis of the effect of Richmond on Gannett, see Note 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 936 (1980).
69. 100 S. Ct. at 2830 n.18.
70. Id. at 2829-30.
71. Id. at 2830.
72. 370 So. 2d at 779.
73. 366 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 376 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 1979), affld
101 S. Ct. 802 (1981).
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national news on television, 7' but he declined to issue a binding
rule that the jurors avoid any accounts of the testimony presented
at trial.78 The television camera was in place for one afternoon
when the state presented the testimony of its chief witness. No
camera, however, recorded any part of the case for the defense. In
total, the media broadcast only two minutes and fifty-five seconds
of the trial .7 The jury subsequently found the defendants guilty
on all counts. 7 The defendants moved for a new trial, claiming
that the electronic media coverage had inherently denied their
right to a fair trial. The Florida District Court of Appeal, Third
District, affirmed the conviction, and the Supreme Court of Florida
denied review, reasoning that the Post-Newsweek decision had
rendered moot any challenge to Canon 3A(7). 7
By granting review in Chandler, the Supreme Court of the
United States acknowledged the need to reconsider its Estes-
Sheppard rationale in light of advances in media technology and
the emergence of empirical data evaluating the effects of media
coverage on trial participants. The Court established the frame-
work for its evaluation by recognizing that it had no power to over-
see state court procedural experimentation; it thus limited its re-
view to ensuring that the state's action did not infringe upon the
fundamental rights guaranteed to the defendants by the Federal
Constitution. The central question, therefore, was whether the Su-
preme Court of Florida had the authority to promulgate Canon
3A(7) for the trial of cases in Florida courts. The Court concluded
that the Constitution did not prohibit Florida from experimenting
with the program authorized by the Canon. A defendant is enti-
tled, however, to show that media coverage compromised his right
to a fair trial. Because the Florida experiment was not per se un-
constitutional, and because the police officers made no specific
showing of prejudice, the Court affirmed their conviction.7 9 The
Chandler decision, however, reveals an acceptance of the electronic
media tempered by recognition of the need for further study of
their effects in the courtroom.
The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, noted that
Estes v. Texas had not announced that the presence of electronic





79. Id. at 813.
[Vol. 35:345
IN RE POST-NEWSWEEK STATIONS
media in the courtroom inherently denied due process. 80 The Court
based this interpretation on the opinion of Justice Harlan, whose
concurrence had been the swing vote in reversing Estes' conviction.
The Court focused on Justice Harlan's reasoning that even though
the presence of the media had "mischievous potentialities for in-
truding upon the detached atmosphere which should always sur-
round the judicial process,"81 its presence was not necessarily
prejudicial. 2
Focusing on Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Estes, the
Court applied the totality-of-the-circumstances approach found in
Richmond Newspapers." Relying on this approach, the Court
found in Chandler neither the "Roman circus" nor the "Yankee
Stadium" atmosphere that had existed in the Estes courtroom.84
Moreover, the Court found that the Chandler defendants had
made no showing of prejudice of constitutional dimensions." The
Court noted that a defendant has the right to show that the me-
dia's coverage compromised his right to a fair trial, but "[t]o
demonstrate prejudice in a specific case a defendant must show
something more than juror awareness that the trial is such as to
attract the attention of broadcasters."8s Thus, the Court recog-
nized that the presence of the media in the courtroom in some
cases might cause sufficient prejudice to constitute a denial of due
process.
But in separate concurring opinions, Justices Stewart and
White construed Estes as having announced a per se rule that the
fourteenth amendment prohibits televising criminal trials over a
defendant's objection. 7 Justice Stewart read both Justice Clark's
opinion for the Court in Estes and Justice Harlan's concurrence as
providing that the mere presence of cameras and similar media re-
cording devices during a criminal trial have an inherently prejudi-
80. Id. at 809.
81. Id. at 808 (quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 587 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
82. [T]here is no constitutional requirement that television be allowed in the
courtroom, and, at least as to a notorious criminal trial such as this one, the
considerations against allowing television in the courtroom so far outweigh the
countervailing factors advanced in its support as to require a holding that what
was done in this case infringed the fundamental right to a fair trial assured by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 808 (quoting 381 U.S. at 591) (emphasis added by Chandler Court.)
83. See Note, supra note 68.
84. 101 S. Ct. at 813.
85. Id.
86. Id. (citing Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800 (1975)).
87. Id. at 814-17 (Stewart & White, JJ., concurring).
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cial effect on the rights of an accused to a fair trial.8 Thus, Jus-
tices Stewart and White argued that the Court should overrule
Estes in order to affirm the judgments against the Chandler
defendants.
Whether it has overruled Estes or not, however, the Court has
reduced that decision to an admonition to proceed with due care,
regardless of Justice Clark's statement in Estes that no isolatable
or actual prejudice had been or need be shown. Despite allowing
the state to continue its experimental televising of criminal trials,
the Court expressed caution. The Court was aware of the possibil-
ity of identifiable prejudice caused by the presence of the elec-
tronic media in the courtroom, and of the need for more detailed
"scientific" surveys of the potential effects on jurors, judges, and
witnesses.8
The Post-Newsweek and Chandler decisions show the present
trend: expanded opportunities for state experimentation with elec-
tronic media coverage in the courtroom, tempered by a cautious
eye toward the very real possibility of demonstrable prejudice. In
that sense, television may remain on trial in the years to come.
PETER J. RUBENSTEIN
88. Id. at 814-15.
89. Although it recognized that comprehensive empirical data on certain aspects of the
problem was not yet available, the Court stated:
[1it is noteworthy that the data now available do not support the proposition
that, in every case and in all circumstances, electronic coverage creates a signifi-
cant adverse effect upon the participants in trials-at least not one uniquely
associated with electronic coverage as opposed to more traditional forms of cov-
erage. Further research may change the picture. At the moment, however, there
is no unimpeachable empirical support for the thesis that the presence of the
electronic media, ipso facto, interferes with trial proceedings.
Id. at 810 n.11.
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